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Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation:
The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act
Abstract
Bank regulators are required to consider a bank’s record of providing credit to low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank applications for
mergers and acquisitions.  We test the hypothesis that banks strategically prepare for the
regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition by increasing their
lending to low-and moderate-income individuals in anticipation of acquiring another
institution.  We find evidence in favor of this hypothesis.  In particular, we show that the
higher the percentage of the institution’s mortgage originations in a given year that are
directed to low- and moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the
probability that the institution will acquire another bank in the following year.  Further
investigation bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks’ anticipation of the
public and regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process.  The effect cannot be
explained by other bank characteristics.  The relationship is observed for acquiring banks,
which are the focus of public and regulatory scrutiny, but not for the banks that are being
acquired.  In addition, the positive effect of lending to low- and moderate-income
individuals and neighborhoods on the likelihood that a bank will acquire another bank
increases over the 1991 – 1995 time frame, a period when public and regulatory scrutiny
of an institution’s community lending record increased. The effect of lending to low- and
moderate-income individuals and neighborhoods is also largest for big banks, who face
particularly intense public and regulatory scrutiny.3
1. Introduction
Between 1975 and 1997 the number of commercial banks and savings
associations operating in the U.S. fell by more than 40%.  Bank mergers and acquisitions
are largely responsible for this banking industry consolidation.  For example, from 1993
to 1997, 21% of banking institutions were acquired in a merger or acquisition (Avery et
al. 1999). For many industries, regulatory agencies place restrictions on the types of
mergers that can take place.   In the U.S., for example, the Justice Department or the
Federal Trade Commission may refuse to permit mergers that are deemed to be anti-
competitive.  The Federal Reserve places similar constraints on bank mergers.  Bank
regulators are also required to consider a bank’s record of providing credit to low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank mergers and
acquisitions, according to the provisions of the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA).  In addition to the formal regulatory review process, community groups also
scrutinize bank mergers. In this paper, we consider how the potential scrutiny of their
CRA lending record during a merger review affects bank behavior.
1  In particular, we test
the hypothesis that banks prepare for the scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition
by increasing CRA lending in anticipation of acquiring another institution.
We find evidence in favor of this hypothesis.  We show that the higher the
percentage of the institution’s mortgage originations in a given year that are directed to
                                                          
1 Most studies focus on the impact of CRA on bank profitability and efficiency.  There has been
considerable debate about the impact of CRA on bank profitability and efficiency.  Studies have shown
that, while lending to low-income individuals and minorities generates greater defaults, greater return
volatility, higher operating costs and charge-off rates, lenders are compensated for this and generate similar
rates of return compared to banks that do not specialize in loans to low- and moderate-income individuals
(Beshouri and Glennon, 1996).  Other researchers have also found that banks that specialize in lending to
low- and moderate-income individuals are as profitable as other banks (Canner and Passmore, 1996;
Malmquist, Phillips-Patrick and Rossi, 1997).4
low- and moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the probability that
the institution will acquire another bank in the following year.  Further investigation
bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks’ anticipation of potential public and
regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process.  First, we use the panel aspects of
the data set to show that the effect cannot be explained by other bank characteristics.  In
addition, the relationship is observed for acquiring banks, which are the focus of public
and regulatory scrutiny, but not for merger targets, who face less scrutiny.  Moreover, the
positive effect of CRA lending on the likelihood that a bank will acquire another bank
increases over the 1991 – 1995 time frame.  This mirrors the increase in public and
regulatory scrutiny of an institution’s community lending record that occurred over this
time period.  And finally, the effect of lending to low- and moderate-income individuals
and neighborhoods is also largest for big banks, who face particularly intense public and
regulatory scrutiny.
In the next section, we provide some additional background information on the
Community Reinvestment Act and describe the data that we analyze.  Section three
describes the empirical framework and our main result.  In this section, we also present
and interpret a series of robustness tests that lead us to conclude that our findings show
that banks respond to the incentives provided by the merger review process.  We discuss
our conclusions and directions for future research in section four.
2.  Background Information and Data
2.1  Community Reinvestment Act5
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in response to
concerns that banks were not meeting the credit needs of local communities.  Deposit
institutions were accused of redlining – that is denying credit to individuals based not on
the individuals’ characteristics but rather on the characteristics of their neighborhood.
The CRA requires banks to meet the credit needs of the communities where they are
chartered – including low- and moderate-income communities – in a way that is
consistent with safe and sound lending practices.  In addition to an annual review, a
bank’s CRA lending record is also considered when a bank seeks regulatory approval to
open new branches or to acquire or merge with another banking institution.
The enforcement of the CRA has evolved since its passage in 1977.  We
concentrate on describing how the regulation has been enforced over the period that we
consider in the analysis, 1991 – 1995, drawing heavily on Evanoff and Segal (1996).
Since 1990, CRA ratings have been public, and congressional amendments to the Act
have increased provisions for public scrutiny of banks and regulators.  Regulatory
agencies perform an evaluation “to assess the institution’s record of meeting the credit
needs of the entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods,
consistent with the safe and sound operation of each institution” (Regulation BB).  In
particular, regulators consider five performance categories in evaluating an institution’s
CRA performance (see Evanoff and Segal for a detailed description):
1)  Ascertainment of community credit needs
2)  Marketing and types of credit offered and extended
3)  Geographic distribution and record of opening and closing offices
4)  Discrimination and other illegal credit practices6
5)  Community development
Banks are given one of four ratings based on this evaluation: outstanding, satisfactory,
needs to improve or substantial non-compliance.
Banks with unsatisfactory CRA ratings are not explicitly sanctioned, although
instances of illegal credit practices can be referred to the Justice Department for further
legal action.  Instead, regulators consider an institution’s CRA record, together with other
factors, when deciding whether to approve an application for a geographic expansion of
facilities through a merger or acquisition, the introduction of new branches, and office
change, etc.  Evanoff and Segal argue that even if an application is ultimately approved,
banks suffer from having a poor CRA rating or being accused of having poor CRA
performance, particularly during a period of consolidation:
For example, the application process can be significantly lengthened and
complicated if community groups protest the application.  In a period in which
banks were aggressively expanding geographically, the potential for lost deals,
delays in expansion, and negative public relations could be quite burdensome.
Evanoff and Segal, 1996
Our analysis of the data is directed at evaluating whether banks respond to the explicit
and implicit incentives that are incorporated into the CRA legislation by increasing
community lending prior to making an acquisition.
Regulatory and public scrutiny of community lending has increased during the
1990’s, culminating with the passage of amendments to CRA in 1995.  These
amendments call for regulators to analyze actions rather than intentions in reviewing7
CRA records.  The new CRA review procedures were implemented in 1996 and 1997, so
they do not directly affect banks during the 1991 – 1995 period we examine.  Our reading
of the literature suggests that the impact of the CRA legislation during the 1991 to 1995
period was primarily via the review of bank applications for geographic expansion.
2.2  Data and Summary Statistics
In order to evaluate whether banks increase CRA lending prior to the regulatory
process associated with a merger or acquisition, we need a data set that includes time-
series information on CRA lending, mergers and acquisitions and bank characteristics.
We combine information from three sources to create this data for the period 1990 to
1995.
2  Information on the amount of CRA lending each bank does each year comes from
data filed under the 1989 amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
We use the Federal Reserve Board’s National Information Center (NIC) database to track
bank mergers and acquisitions.  Additional information on bank characteristics comes
from the Reports on the Condition and Income (Call Reports) that banks file with
regulators each year.
We use the HMDA data to quantify the amount of CRA lending that an institution
originated during a year.  Each year, nearly all commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions and other mortgage lending institutions (primarily mortgage
banks) with assets of more than $10 million and an office in a metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) are required to report on each mortgage loan application related to a one- to
four-unit residence acted upon during the calendar year.  We define CRA lending as the8
percentage of the institution’s total home mortgage originations in a year that are:
(i)  to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods (Census tracts with median
family income that is less than 80% of the median family income for the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA)), or
(ii)  to low- and moderate-income individuals (individuals whose income is
less than 80% of the median family income for the MSA).
Our measure of CRA lending is based solely on home-mortgage lending because
public data are only available for mortgages over the period we study.  However,
regulators focused a broader range of loan products during the CRA review process.
During this period, banks were not required to report on other CRA-mandated activities
like small business and farm loans and community reinvestment projects.
3  Our reliance
on the HMDA data means that we exclude banks whose assets are less than $10 million
and banks that do not have offices in an MSA.  This is unlikely to lead to serious biases,
since approximately 80% of all home purchase loans are covered by the HMDA data for
the period we study (Avery et al., 1999).
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 We analyze whether a bank made an acquisition during the period 1991 – 1995, but include information
about CRA lending and bank characteristics in the year prior to the acquisition, so we make use of HMDA
and Call Report data from 1990 to 1994.
3 The 1995 amendments to CRA make provisions for banks to report small business and rural lending.9
We use the Federal Reserve Bank Board’s National Information Center (NIC)
database to identify banks that were acquired and banks that acquired other banks during
each calendar year.  In most cases the identification of acquirers and targets was
straightforward.  However, in a few instances the consolidation resulted in a new
organization.  In such cases, the institution with the largest pre-consolidation assets was
defined to be the acquirer.  We identify acquirers and targets at the bank level, rather than
at the bank holding company level.  For example, if a bank holding company acquired
another bank, all of the original affiliates of the bank holding company are defined to be
acquirers in that transaction.
4
In addition to the information on CRA lending and mergers, we also use data
from the Call Reports that banks file each year.  The Call Report data are used to
construct important variables – total assets, capital ratios, leverage ratios – for each bank.
In the analysis, we control for these key bank characteristics so that we can appropriately
interpret the role of CRA lending in predicting bank behavior.
The data we analyze consist of five years of information for a little more than
4,800 banks, for a total of 24,000 bank-years.  Table I documents the number of banks
that acquired another bank and the number of banks that were acquired by another bank
in each year of the data that we analyze.  The percentage of banks that acquired another
bank ranges from 8% in 1991 to a high of 11% in 1994.  The percentage of banks that
were the target of a merger is much smaller, ranging from 3% in 1991 to 5% in 1994.
5
                                                          
4 The analysis is conducted at the bank level because the CRA scrutinizes activity at this level rather than at
the bank holding company level.  That said, our results are robust to aggregating the data by bank holding
company – i.e. treating all of the members of a bank holding company as a single observation.
5 This result is an artifact of our treatment of each bank in a holding company as a single observation.  The
acquisition of a single bank by a bank holding company will lead to more acquirers than targets, since each
bank in the bank holding company will be considered to have made an acquisition in this case.  Recall that
the results are robust to treating all of the members of a bank holding company as a single institution.10
Table II summarizes the data for the whole sample of bank-years and separately
for acquiring banks and banks that were acquired.  As we would expect, acquiring banks
are much larger – total assets of the average acquiring bank are 2.3 times larger than that
of the average target bank.  Acquiring banks are also more likely to be part of a bank
holding company, 97% versus 78% for targets of mergers.  Loans to low- and moderate-
income individuals and neighborhoods make up a similar share of acquirer and target
loan originations.  Approximately 1/3
rd of all mortgage loans fall into this category.  The
vast majority of CRA loans are made to low- and moderate-income areas, rather than to
individuals.  Acquirers have a slightly higher ratio of loans to total assets compared to
target banks: 60% versus 58%.  Target banks make a higher share of home-mortgage
loans compared to acquiring banks: 57% versus 52%.
3. Empirical Framework and Results
In this section, we present tests of our central hypothesis: that banks anticipate the
regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition and increase CRA
lending in advance of acquiring another institution.  We also present a number of other
estimates to examine the robustness of the results and to assess whether they are in fact
driven by bank reaction to regulatory incentives.
3.1  Main Finding
Our main finding is presented in the columns headed “No Individual Bank
Controls” in Table III.  This column reports maximum likelihood logit estimates of the
likelihood that a bank acquires another bank in a given year as a function of CRA lending11
in the previous 12 months, controls for bank characteristics, also measured in the year
prior to the data on acquisitions, and year controls.  Specifically, the estimation chooses
parameters (β, γ, and λ) to maximize:
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The dependent variable, Ait, is equal to one if bank i made an acquisition in year t and is
equal to zero otherwise.  The vector Xit-1 includes bank size (measured as the log of total
assets), an indicator variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a bank
holding company, and the bank’s capital to asset ratio.  The vector Yt contains indicators
for each year from 1991 to 1994.  The most recent year that our data covers, 1995, is the
omitted category.  We estimate this equation for the 23,481 bank-years (4,670 banks)
where the banks either made an acquisition or did nothing.  In other words, we eliminate
banks that were acquired from the estimation.  This gives us the appropriate comparison
group: acquire versus do not acquire, rather than acquire versus do not acquire or be
acquired.  As a result, the 925 banks that were targets of an acquisition are not used in the
estimation.
6
                                                          
6 The findings are virtually identical if we do not exclude the 925 banks that were acquired.12
We find that large banks are significantly more likely to acquire other banks.
Increasing assets from $585 million (the average for all banks) to $1570 million (the
average for acquiring banks) would increase the probability of an acquisition in the next
calendar year by about 2 percentage points, a 20% increase in the average probability of
making an acquisition.  The capital-asset ratio does not have a significant effect on the
likelihood of making an acquisition.  Banks that are part of a bank holding company are
10 percentage points more likely to make an acquisition than their counterparts that are
not part of a bank holding company.  Acquisitions were approximately one percentage
point less likely in 1991 and 1992 and one percentage point more likely in 1994
compared to 1995.
The probability of an acquisition is also significantly influenced by the percentage
of the bank’s mortgage originations that went to low- or moderate-income individuals
and areas in the preceding calendar year.  The results indicate that moving a bank from
the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile of the CRA lending distribution would lead to a
0.76 percentage point increase in the average probability of an acquisition in the
following year.
7  This is an increase of 2.3% relative to the observed probability of an
acquisition.  To achieve an equivalent increase in the probability of an acquisition, total
assets of the average bank would have to increase by 43% or 252 million dollars.
                                                          
7 The bank at the 25
th percentile of the CRA lending distribution makes 16.7% of its home mortgage loans
to low- and moderate-income individuals or areas.  At the 75
th percentile, 48.5% of home mortgage loans
go to low- and moderate-income individuals or areas.13
This finding suggests that banks increase community lending prior to making an
acquisition and that the effect is economically significant.  The rest of this section is
concerned with establishing whether the correlation between CRA lending and future
acquisitions can be attributed to a desire on the part of the bank to ensure that the public
and regulatory review of its acquisition plans go smoothly.
3.2 Robustness and Interpretation
3.2.1  Other bank characteristics
An alternative explanation for the finding that CRA lending predicts future
acquisitions is that banks with high CRA lending happen to be more likely to make
acquisitions for some reason that has nothing to do with the regulatory and public
scrutiny associated with an acquisition.  For example, maybe urban banks have higher
CRA lending and are also more likely to make acquisitions.  Or perhaps retail banks have
higher CRA lending and are also more likely to acquire other banks. Another possibility
is that more efficient banks do more CRA lending and are also more likely to make
acquisitions.  We address these possibilities by taking advantage of the panel nature of
the data set and including bank fixed-effects in the estimation.  The fixed effects control
for time-invariant bank specific characteristics.  These estimates provide an answer to the
question: If a bank increases CRA lending, does the likelihood that it makes an
acquisition go up?  In contrast, the first estimate shows that banks with higher levels of
CRA lending have a greater likelihood of making an acquisition, compared to other
banks.14
The fixed-effects results are found in the columns of Table III that are headed
“Individual Bank Controls”.  Figure 1 summarizes the effect of CRA lending on the
probability of future acquisitions for the fixed effect estimate.  In addition to the
explanatory variables that were included before, this estimate also includes a control
variable for every single bank.  As a result, banks that made no acquisitions between
1991 and 1995 and banks that made an acquisition in every year of the sample are
dropped from the estimation.  The fixed effect fully explains the acquisition patterns for
these banks.  We are left with a sample of 4,510 bank-years (902 banks).
Past CRA lending is a significant and important predictor of future acquisitions
even when we control for bank fixed effects. This rules out the possibility that the
association between CRA lending and future acquisitions is driven by some other time-
invariant bank characteristic that was not captured in the estimates that did not include
bank fixed effects.   The likelihood of making an acquisition would increase by 3.3
percentage points if a bank were to go from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile of
CRA lending.
8  This is equivalent to an 8% increase in the overall likelihood of making
acquisition for these banks.
3.2.2  Targets
Regulatory and public scrutiny is typically more focused on acquiring banks than
on the banks that they acquire.  If the relationship between CRA lending and future
acquisitions is driven by a desire to prepare for the regulatory and public scrutiny
associated with a merger, then we would expect to see no relationship between CRA15
lending and the probability of being acquired by another bank.  Because merger targets
typically face much less scrutiny, they will have lower incentives to increase CRA
lending prior to being acquired.  This hypothesis is explored in Table IV.
This table presents logit estimates of the probability of being the target of a
merger for the 22,051 bank-years (4,410 banks) where the banks was either acquired or
no transaction took place.  We eliminate bank-years where the bank made an acquisition
from the estimation.  Banks with higher capital to asset ratios are less likely to be
acquired and members of a bank holding company are more likely to be acquired.  Banks
are less likely to be acquired in 1991 and 1992 and more likely to be acquired in 1994
relative to 1995. CRA lending has no statistical or substantive impact on the likelihood of
being the target of a merger.  This finding bolsters the argument that the anticipation of
public and regulatory scrutiny drives the link between CRA lending and future
acquisitions.
3.2.3 Year
In the introduction, we argue that public and regulatory scrutiny of a bank’s CRA
lending record has become more intense over the 1991 to 1995 time period that we study.
If the connection between CRA lending and future acquisitions is due to bank
anticipation of the public and regulatory scrutiny associated with a merger, then the effect
of CRA lending on the probability of future acquisitions should increase through time.
We test this hypothesis in Table V.  This table presents logit estimates of the probability
of acquiring another bank as a function of the control variables discussed above.
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 For the sample that is used in producing the fixed-effects results, this is equivalent to going from 20% to
43% of home mortgage originations being directed toward to low- and moderate-income individuals or16
In addition, the effect of CRA lending is allowed to vary by year.  Separate
coefficients are estimated to capture the effect of CRA lending in 1990 on acquisitions in
1991, of CRA lending in 1991 on acquisitions in 1992 and so on.  CRA lending in 1990
and 1991 does not have a significant impact on the probability of an acquisition in the
following years.  However, the effect of CRA lending is significant and increasing from
1992 to 1994.  Moving a bank from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the CRA lending
distribution in 1992 would increase the average probability of an acquisition by 0.89
percentage points in 1993.  For acquisitions in 1994, the effect is 1.24 percentage points
and for 1995 it is 1.30 percentage points.
9  The size of the CRA effect is not statistically
different across the 1992 – 1994 time period.  However, the effect of CRA lending in
1992, 1993 and 1994 is significantly larger than the effect of CRA lending in 1990 and
1991.  Figure 2 summarizes the effect of a 25% increase in CRA lending on the
probability of future acquisitions for each year.
The evidence that the association between CRA lending and future acquisitions is
stronger when regulatory and public attention is more intense provides additional
evidence that it is this scrutiny that leads banks to increase CRA lending prior to making
acquisitions.
3.2.4  Size
Public and regulatory scrutiny is particularly intense for big banks that make
acquisitions.  To the extent that the relationship between CRA lending and acquisitions is
driven by a desire to prepare for this scrutiny, we would expect that CRA lending will
                                                                                                                                                                            
areas.17
have a larger impact on the probability of an acquisition for big banks compared to
smaller banks.  We explore this possibility in Table VI.  This table reports the results of
logit estimates of the probability of an acquisition as a function of the same independent
variables as the previous estimates, with one exception.  In this estimate the impact of
CRA lending is allowed to vary with the size of the bank.  Separate coefficients for CRA
lending are estimated for each asset quartile.
The relationship between CRA lending and the probability of future acquisitions
is driven by banks whose assets are in the upper half of the distribution.  For banks in the
lowest quartile of assets, CRA lending actually has a significantly negative effect on the
probability of future acquisitions.  CRA lending has no significant effect on acquisitions
for banks in the second asset quartile.  CRA lending has a significant and positive effect
for banks in the third and fourth asset quartile.  For banks in the third asset quartile, going
from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the CRA lending distribution will lead to a 0.89
percentage point increase in the probability of an acquisition.  The effect for banks in the
highest asset quartile is significantly larger.  For these banks, a similar increase in CRA
lending is associated with an increase in the probability of an acquisition of 2.29
percentage points.
10  The effect of a 25% increase in CRA lending on the probability of
an acquisition for banks in each asset quartile is also summarized in Figure 3.  The
evidence presented in Table VI and summarized in Figure 3 reinforces the view that
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 The 25
th percentile of the CRA lending distribution went up from 15% in 1992 to 20% in 1994.  The 75
th
percentile increased from 46% to 50% over the same time period.
10 While the 25
th percentile of the CRA lending distribution is fairly similar across asset quartile, ranging
from 15.4% to 17.7%, the 75
th percentile decreases with bank size.  For the first asset quartile it is 60% and
for the highest asset quartile it is 37.5%.  So for the third asset quartile, a 27.4 percentage point increase in
CRA lending is associated with a 0.89 percentage point increase in the likelihood of making an acquisition
in the following year.  For banks in the highest asset quartile, a 19.8 percentage point increase in CRA
lending produces a 2.29 percentage point increase in the probability of an acquisition in the following year.18
banks prepare for the public and regulatory attention associated with an acquisition by
increasing CRA lending in anticipation of making an acquisition.
4.  Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
We present evidence that banks increase CRA lending in anticipation of the
regulatory and public scrutiny associated with making an acquisition.  The results cannot
be explained by other bank characteristics, and they are strongest for banks that face the
most public and regulatory scrutiny.  In addition to being statistically significant, the
results are also economically important.  At a minimum, moving from the 25
th to the 75
th
percentile of the distribution of CRA lending is associated with a 0.8 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of making an acquisition in the following year. The total assets
of the average bank would have to increase by 43%, or 252 million dollars, to achieve an
equivalent increase in the probability of an acquisition. For the marginal banks, the fixed
effect estimates are the most relevant, because this sample excludes banks that make
acquisitions in every year and banks that make no acquisitions over the sample period.
The fixed effects estimates indicate that the same change in CRA lending would lead to a
3.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an acquisition.
The findings suggest that enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act
provisions will be particularly effective during periods of consolidation in the banking
industry. The effectiveness of the regulation is likely to vary with the likelihood of future
acquisitions, or more generally, with the likelihood that banks will need regulatory
approval for expansion into new geographic areas or into new activities.  For example
under the provisions of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (1999), banks that wish to expand
their activities into insurance and/or security underwriting will need to seek regulatory19
approval.  Regulators are required to consider a bank’s record of community lending in
deciding whether to allow the bank to expand their activities, in much the same way that
regulators currently consider CRA lending in reviewing applications for geographic
expansion via mergers and acquisitions.
The desirability of providing incentives to lend to low- and moderate-income
individuals and areas via the merger review process depends on the interplay of many
complicated issues that go far beyond the scope of this paper.  These issues include the
factors that motivate mergers in the first place and the impact of CRA lending on bank
profitability and efficiency.  Our findings suggest that the link between CRA lending and
acquisitions acts as a tax on mergers.
11  The significance of this tax is a matter of some
debate.  If bank consolidation is desirable from society’s perspective, then this tax is
costly in that it raises the costs of consolidation for acquirers and indirectly protects
inefficient banks that would be acquisition targets.  Further, making cost-effective loans
to low- and moderate-income individuals and areas may require banks to invest in
additional costly activities that increase their expertise in lending to this segment of the
population.  On the other hand, evidence suggests that the CRA loans originated by banks
are relatively profitable and contribute positively to bank profitability.
12  Moreover, any
benefits society receives from increasing CRA lending also must be considered in this
context.  It is left for future research to determine if the benefits of CRA lending
outweigh the costs of linking the enforcement of the CRA to the merger review process.
                                                          
11 The “tax” interpretation does not rely on an assumption that CRA loans lose money.  However, making
cost-effective loans to low- and moderate-income individuals and areas may require banks to invest in
activities that increase their expertise in lending to this segment of the population.
12 Survey evidence is reported in “The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending”  Report by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 713
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.20
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Figure 1: Impact of CRA Lending on the Probability of Acquisition, Controlling for
Bank Fixed Effects22
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Figure 2: Impact of a 25% Increase in Prior Year CRA Lending on the Probability
of Acquisition, by Year23
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Figure 3: Impact of a 25% Increase in Prior Year CRA Lending on the Probability
of Acquisition, by Bank Size24
Table I
Number of Bank Acquirers and Targets by Year
The sample includes banks for which the following information could be matched: home
mortgage originations reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
balance sheet information from the Call Reports and merger information from NIC.  A
bank is considered an acquirer if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in
a given year.  Similarly a bank is defined to be a target of an acquisition if the bank or its
holding company were acquired in a given year.
All Banks Acquirers Targets
Year Number Number % of Sample Number % of Sample
1991 4854 402 8.3% 144 3.0%
1992 4862 400 8.2% 173 3.6%
1993 4997 519 10.4% 201 4.0%
1994 4859 553 11.4% 228 4.7%
1995 4906 481 9.8% 179 3.7%
Table II
Summary Statistics for Bank Acquirers and Targets, 1991 - 1995
The table presents the sample means of each characteristic for all bank-year observations
and for acquirer and target sub-samples. The CRA-eligible share of originations is the
percentage of a bank’s home mortgage originations that are made to low- or moderate-
income individuals or neighborhoods.  This information is reported under HMDA. The
rest of the information reported in the table comes from the Call Reports.  Mortgage loans
are loans for the purchase of dwellings with up to four units.
All Banks Acquirers Targets
Total Assets ($ millions) 584.9 1568.9 670.6
Total Loans/ Total Assets 0.58 0.60 0.56
Capital-Asset Ratio 0.084 0.079 0.076
Percentage affiliated with a Bank Holding Company 69% 97% 78%
CRA-eligible Percentage of Originations 34% 35% 34%
Mortgage Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans 60% 52% 57%
Number of Sample Banks 24,478 2,355 92525
Table III
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Making an Acquisition
The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA
eligible share of originations in the previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to assets in the
previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company (BHC).  In addition, the
estimates include controls for years.  The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in
the calendar year.  The sample includes bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995.  *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.  **
Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
No Individual Bank Controls Individual Bank Controls
[1] [2]
Coefficient Z-statistic dy/dx Coefficient Z-statistic dy/dx
1
CRA-eligible share of originations 0.477
*** 4.71 0.024 0.482
** 2.19 0.103
Log (Total Assets) 0.422
*** 28.34 0.021 -0.180 -1.24 -0.038
Capital-Asset Ratio -1.166 -1.09 -0.059 12.050
*** 3.94 2.564
BHC affiliation indicator 2.665
*** 19.77 0.104 0.612 1.47 0.115
Year = 1991 -0.174
** -2.28 -0.008 -0.610
*** -5.10 -0.120
Year = 1992 -0.181
** -2.39 -0.009 -0.560
*** -5.05 -0.111
Year = 1993 0.110 1.54 0.006 -0.086 -0.87 -0.018
Year = 1994 0.190
*** 2.69 0.010 0.106 1.11 0.023
Constant -9.726
*** -36.39
Pseudo R-squared 14.9% 4.3%
Observed frequency of acquisitions 9.8% 41.5%
Fixed Effects No Yes
Number of Observations
2 23,481 4,510
[1] For the estimate that includes individual bank controls, dy/dx is calculated setting the individual bank effect equal to zero.
[2] For the estimate that does not include individual bank controls, the sample excludes bank-year observations when the bank was the target of an acquisition.
The estimate that includes individual bank controls also excludes bank-year observations when the bank was the target of an acquisition.  The fixed effects
estimate also drops banks when there is insufficient variation to estimate a fixed effect -- that is banks that never made an acquisition during the sample period
and banks that made an acquisition in every year of the sample period are dropped.26
Table IV
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Being the Target of an Acquisition
The table presents logit estimates of the probability of being the target of an acquisition
in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the
previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to
assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a
Bank Holding Company (BHC).  In addition, the estimates include controls for years.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company was acquired
during the calendar year.  The sample is made up of bank-year observations from 1991 to
1995.  *** Indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** Indicates significance at the 5%
level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
Coefficient Z-Statistic dy/dx
CRA-eligible share of originations 0.009 0.06 0.000
Log (Total Assets) 0.009 0.33 0.000
Capital-Asset Ratio -15.442
*** -9.82 -0.534
BHC affiliation indicator 0.443
*** 5.32 0.014
Year = 1991 -0.446
*** -3.79 -0.014
Year = 1992 -0.241
** -2.14 -0.008
Year = 1993 -0.013 -0.12 -0.000









[1] The sample excludes bank-year observations when the bank made an acquisition.27
Table V
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Making an Acquisition,
The Impact of CRA by Year
The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the
current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the
previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to
assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a
Bank Holding Company (BHC).  The impact of CRA lending is allowed to vary by year.
In addition, the estimates include controls for years.  The dependent variable is equal to
one if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in the current calendar year.
The sample is made up of bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995.  *** Indicates
significance at the 1% level.  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
Coefficient Z-Statistic dy/dx
CRA-eligible share of originations
   CRA in 1990 0.036 0.15 0.002
   CRA in 1991 0.046 0.19 0.002
   CRA in 1992 0.559
*** 2.65 0.028
   CRA in 1993 0.781
*** 3.71 0.039
   CRA in 1994 0.816
*** 3.67 0.041
Log (Total Assets) 0.422
*** 28.33 0.021
Capital-Asset Ratio -1.140 -1.07 -0.057
BHC affiliation indicator 2.662
*** 19.74 0.104
Year = 1991 0.088 0.65 0.005
Year = 1992 0.090 0.65 0.005
Year = 1993 0.216 1.60 0.011








[1] The sample excludes banks that were the target of an acquisition.28
Table VI
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Making an Acquisition,
The Impact of CRA by Bank Size
The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the
current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the
previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to
assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a
Bank Holding Company (BHC).  The impact of CRA lending is allowed to vary with
bank size, where bank size is captured by quartiles of total assets.  In addition, the
estimates include controls for years.  The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or
its holding company made an acquisition in the current calendar year.  The sample
includes of bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995.  *** Indicates significance at the
1% level.  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the
10% level.
Coefficient Z-Statistic dy/dx
CRA-eligible share of originations
   CRA for lowest asset quartile -0.381
** -2.08 -0.019
   CRA for second asset quartile -0.092 -0.57 -0.004
   CRA for third asset quartile 0.577
*** 4.27 0.028
   CRA for highest asset quartile 1.462
*** 9.70 0.072
Log (Total Assets) 0.299
*** 14.74 0.015
Capital-Asset Ratio -1.194 -1.11 -0.058
BHC affiliation indicator 2.648
*** 19.63 0.100
Year = 1991 -0.137
* -1.79 -0.006
Year = 1992 -0.153
** -2.00 -0.007
Year = 1993 0.130
* 1.81 0.007









[1] The sample excludes banks that were the target of an acquisition.1
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